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LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS OF FOOD TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS.

I.

On Theory of Warranty.

That the ordinary consumer possesses little means of determining
the quality of any food product that he may desire to purchase, much
less whether or not any specific brand that he selects is superior to
any other brand which he might have chosen, is beyond dispute. The
consumer, accordingly, is virtually dependent on the manufacturer
and dealer to furnish food products which are fit for human consumption.
Under the Uniform Sales Act,' this reliance of the buyer upon
the superior knowledge of the seller may give rise not only to an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, but also to an2
implied warranty of merchantability. Section 15(1) of the Act
provides:
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer
or not 3), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be reasonably fit for such purpose."
Under this section it has been held that "the mere purchase by
a customer from a retail dealer in foods of an article ordinarily used
for human consumption does by implication make known to the
vendor the purpose for which the article is required", 4 so that if the
article sold is unwholesome, there is a breach of this warranty. 5 This
is so notwithstanding that the articles of food are sold by the dealer
in their original package.6 In such a case, although the buyer knows
1 This is embodied in N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 82-159.

2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(1).
3 Under the common law, only a manufacturer or grower was held liable
upon these warranties. The Act, by the inclusion of the words "whether he be
the grower or manufacturer or not," results in making all sellers liable for
breach of these warranties. See WHITNEY, SALES (2d ed. 1934) 195.
4 Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 73, 121 N. E. 471, 472 (1918).
Accord: Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 90 Cal. 154, 47 P. (2d) 708
(1935); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, 259 Ky. 103, 81 S. W. (2d) 900
(1935) ; Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481 (1908).
5 Ibid.
6 Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 620 (1915); Ward v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225 (1918); Griffin v. James Butler
Grocery Co., 108 N. J. L. 192, 156 Atl. 636 (1931); Lieberman v. Sheffield
Farms, 117 Misc. 531, 191 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1921); Rinaldi v. Mohican Co.,
225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1918). Contra: Great A. & P. Tea Co. v.
Gwilliams, 189 Ark. 1037, 76 S. W. (2d) 65 (1934); Scruggins v. Jones, 207
Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743 (1925) ; Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R., 110 Me. 105,
85 Atl. 396 (1912).
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that the seller has had no opportunity to inspect the contents thereof,7
yet "he relies on the dealer to provide a stock of provisions to select
from, all of which is suitable as wholesome food." 8 However, where
the purchaser orders the article of food under a trade or patent name,
he is presumed to have exercised his own judgment as to its suitability for his purposes, so that no warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose will be implied. 9 But Section 15 of the Act continues: 10
"Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of a merchantable quality."
It has been held that a sale under a trade or patent name may
also be a sale by description, and, therefore, will give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability."- Obviously, the sale of food not
fit for human consumption will result in a breach of this warranty,
12
for unwholesome food cannot be said to be of merchantable quality.
Thus, the establishment of liability of a vendor to his immediate vendee for damages resulting from the sale of unwholesome food, being
predicated on these warranties, is comparatively simple. All the
plaintiff need prove in such an action is the contract of sale, the pres13
ence of the injurious substance, and the resulting injury.
Where the plaintiff is not the immediate vendee, but an ultimate
consumer, and his action is directed not at the retailer, but at the
manufacturer with whom he is not in privity of contract, a different
situation is presented. Some jurisdictions, adhering to a more liberal
viewpoint, hold that an action between a remote consumer and a
manufacturer is no different than if the consumer were an immediate
7Arnowitz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 134 Misc. 276, 236 N. Y. Supp.
(1929).
8 VOLD, SALES (1931) 465; see note 6, supra.
9 Hubbard Fertilizer Co. of Baltimore City v. American Trona Corp.,
Md. 246, 120 Atl. 522 (1923); Acorn Silk Co. v. Herscovitz, 250 Mass.
146 N. E. 34 (1925); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y.

133
142
553,
388,

175 N. E. 105 (1931); Matteson v. Lagace, 36 R. I. 223, 89 Atl. 713 (1914) ;
Aetna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding & Kimball Co., 98 Vt. 51, 126 Atl. 582
(1924); Northwestern Blaugas Co. v. Guild, 169 Wis. 98, 171 N. W. 662
(1919).
10 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(2).
"2Pew Co. v. Karley, 168 Iowa 170, 150 N. W. 12 (1914) ; Glover Machinery Works v. Cooke Jellico Coat Co., 173 Ky. 675, 191 S. W. 516 (1917);
Ireland v. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1922); Bekkenold v.
Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931); Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co.,
151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929).
12 Granstein v. Wyman, 250 Mass. 290, 145 N. E. 450 (1924); Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931); MElicK,
THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRiNK (1936) 50.
13

Leahy v. Essex Co., 164 App. Div. 903, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1063 (3d Dept.

1914) ; Wmzmy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 201.
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vendee, and accordingly impose liability upon the manufacturer for
breach of these warranties. This viewpoint was expressed in Nemela
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.14 In that case, the court said: "It is only
when the action is brought by the ultimate consumer against the
manufacturer or packer that the difficulty arises, warranty being
founded on contract, and there being no privity of contract, at least
in the ordinary sense of the term, between the ultimate consumer
and the manufacturer who has merely put the goods upon the market
for sale to the general public at retail. But even in this situation the
action for breach of warranty is nevertheless allowed in the case of
foodstuffs, beverages; and the like, which are put up in such a way
that the condition of the contents may not be known until opened
for use by the ultimate consumer, the theory being that 'under modem
conditions when products of food or drink have been prepared under
the exclusive supervision of the manufacturer and the consumer must
take them as they are supplied, the representations constitute an implied contract, or implied warranty, to the unknown and helpless
consumer that the article is good and wholesome and fit for use. If
privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and circumstance of modem merchandise in such matter, privity of contract
exists in the consciousness and understanding of all right-thinking
persons.' 15
In New York, however, it is settled that a manufacturer is not
liable for breach of an implied warranty to an ultimate consumer
unless privity of contract exists between them, and since there is
usually no such privity, the manufacturer cannot be held for breach
of these warranties. Chysky v. Drake' 6 is the leading New York
case enunciating this rule. In that case, the plaintiff was injured
when a nail embedded in a cake that she -was eating, stuck in her gum
and so infected it as to necessitate the removal of three of her teeth.
It appeared that the plaintiff, who was employed as a waitress in a
lunch-room, received lodge and board as part of her wages, and
that the cake in question was furnished to her by her employer as
part of her lunch. The cake was made and sold to her employer by
the defendant. In denying her a recovery against the defendant
manufacturer, the Court of Appeals said: "If there were an implied
warranty which inured to the benefit of the plaintiff it must be because there was some contractual relation between her and the defendant, and there was no such contract. She never saw the defen14 104 S. W. (2d) 773, 775 (Mo. App. 1937).

15 The following have held a manufacturer liable to an ultimate consumer
for breach of warranty: Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P. (2d) 162
(1890) ; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) ;
Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933) ; Hertzler v. Manshum,
228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924); Curtis Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss.
426, 141 So. 762 (1932) ; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzion, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161
N. E. 557 (1928) ; Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. 515, 156 Atl.
437 (1931) ; Flessher v. Cartsens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916).
16235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).
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dant, and so far as appears, did not know from whom her employer
purchased the cake. The general rule is that a manufacturer or
seller of food, or other articles of personal property, is not liable to
third persons, under an implied warranty, who have no contractual
relation with him. The reason for this rule is that privity of contract does not exist between the seller and such third persons, and
unless there be privity of contract, there can be no implied warranty.
The benefit of a warranty, either express or implied, does not run
with a chattel on its resale, and in this respect is unlike a covenant
running with the land so as to give a subsequent purchaser a right
of action against the original seller." 17 But the court seemed to have
lost sight of the fact that a warranty may be a duty independently
imposed by law because of consideration of social advantage, and that
it is not necessarily contractual in its nature.' 8 As is said by Pro17 It is interesting to note that the plaintiff could not recover on the theory
of implied warranty even against her employer. This is for the reason that
there was no sale of the food by her employer to her, and in New York it is
also held that an implied warranty can only arise as an incident to a sale. See
Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N. Y. Supp. 266 (1936). Thus, plaintiff was
left without a remedy unless she could prove negligence on either the part of
her employer or the manufacturer.
The following have held that privity of contract is essential in an action
for breach of an implied warranty: Birmingham Chero-Cola Co. v. Clark, 205
Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921) ; Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S. W.
40 (1919) ; Binion v. Sasaki, 80 Cal. App. Dec. 910, 41 P. (2d) 585 (1935);
Moore v. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 Ga. 335, 179 S. E. 916 (1935);
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 Pac. 1118
(1922) ; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930) ;
Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ati. 186 (1925); Goldman & Freeman
Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866 (1922); Newhall v. Ward
Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922) ; Howson v. Foster Beef Co.,
177 AtI. 656 (N. H. 1935); Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748,
70 AtI. 314 (1908) ; Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard, 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30
(1935) ; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884
(1929); Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155
(1915); Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 545 (Tex.
C. A. 1935); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (1927).
18 See VoLD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 439 et seq.; MELICK, op.. cit. supra
note 12, at 94; Williston, The Progress of the Law (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV.
762; Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (1919) 5 Iowa L.
BULL. 86, 96. See also notes 15, supra, and 63, infra; Craig v. Pellet, 209 II1.
App. 368 (1918) ("An implied warranty in the case of a sale of an article is an
obligation imposed by law") ; Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 89, 216 N. W.
790, 791 (1927) ("An implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements
of an agreement. It is not one of the essential elements to be stated in a
contract, nor does its application or effective existence rest or depend upon the
affirmative intention of the parties. It is a child of the law. It, because of the
acts of the parties, is imposed by law. * ** The purpose and use of the implied
warranty is to promote high standards in business and to discourage sharp
dealings. It rests upon the principle that honesty is the best policy * *o" ;

Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 564 (1860)

("Implied warranties do not rest

upon any supposed agreement in fact. They are obligations which the law
raises upon principles foreign to the actual contract; principles which are
strictly analogous to those upon which vendors are held liable for fraud").
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fessor Williston, 19 a warranty obligation is analogous to a quasicontract or tort obligation, and that since the action originally was
founded in tort (although it later developed into assumpsit20), an
actual agreement to contract is not necessary. Recognition of this
fact by the court would have resulted in placing the risk upon the
party best able to bear the burden and who was at fault in the first
instance. Furthermore, there seems to be no logical reason for compelling the purchaser to proceed against the retailer. This was observed in Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co., Inc., 21 wherein Pankin, J.,
said: "My own opinion, however, is that, though there be no privity
of contract, where a manufacturer prepares articles or manufactures
foodstuffs. in sealed packages, and what these sealed packages contain is held out as fit for human consumption, the preparer or manufacturer of the articles would be ultimately liable. The distributor
with whom the contract is made by the consumer, in event of damage
to him by reason of some defect in the food product distributed, would
under the law have the right to recover from the person or group
manufacturing or preparing the article that he distributed. Under
the new Civil Practice Act, the distributor might even bring in the
manufacturer or producer as a party defendant, so that if the recovery is to be against him, he might in turn recover as against the
producer or manufacturer. This situation requires some modification
in the law. The courts have held repeatedly that, where negligence
can be proved, privity of contract need not be shown. It is not always possible to prove negligence. * * * Why there should be one
rule when the action rests in negligence, and another rule when the
action is for breach of warranty, * * * is not apparent to me. If,
in the end the manufacturer or producer is liable for any defect or
unwholesomeness in the article that he manufactures, and which he
holds out to the public as being fit for the purposes manufactured
for, there seems to be no reason why intermediate action should be
required." 22
In some jurisdictions, the courts have circumvented the barriers
presented by the privity rule, by invoking the third party beneficiary
doctrine, reasoning that since the manufacturer is fully aware that the
retailer does not purchase the article for his own consumption, but
purchases it for the purpose of sale to the members of the public
who are ultimate consumers, he must have intended the implied warranty for their benefit. 23 But this theory was rejected in New York
in Giminez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 24 Therein the court
19
20

1

WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed.
WHITNEY, op. cit. suepra

1924) 368.

note 2, at 201.
21 129 Misc. 765, 766, 222 N. Y. Supp. 725, 726 (1927).
22 See also WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 202.
23 Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932) ; Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928) ; see Challis v.
Hartoloff, Machin, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933).
24264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934).

See
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said: "We do not overlook the fact that a sort of third party beneficiary rule might be invoked to give the husband [not the immediate
vendee] a cause of action in contract. The answer to that contention
is that the courts have never gone so'far as to recognize warranties
for the benefit of third persons." 25
Although one is generally not liable for breach of an implied
warranty to one with whom he is not in privity, yet it would seem
that a manufacturer may be liable to an ultimate consumer on an
express warranty made by way of labels, advertisements, etc. 26 In
25 Although the third party beneficiary doctrine has been held not to apply
to warranty cases in New York, the rules and principles governing undisclosed
agencies do apply. Accordingly, if an agent purchases food products for an
undisclosed principal who is injured because of the unwholesomeness thereof,
the undisclosed principal may bring an action against the vendee based upon
breach of implied warranty. This situation usually arises where a wife pur-

chases food with money furnished by her husband. In such a case, if the

husband is injured because of the unfitness of the food, he may maintain an
action against the seller for breach of implied warranty, although he himself
did not make the purchase. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y.
388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931) (husband entitled to recover on theory of warranty
for injuries sustained when he' ate bread containing a concealed pin, although

his wife made the purchase with money supplied by him). Again, "a person

whose agency is unknown, contracts in his own right", so that although the
undisclosed principal (the husband) may bring suit on the contract, this does
not preclude the agent (the wife) from also maintaining suit. Meyer v.
Kerschbaum, 133 Misc. 330, 232 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1928) (wife, who purchased
buns from a bakery and was injured by a tack in the bun, was entitled to

recover for her injuries on the theory of breach of implied warranty, and this
notwithstanding the fact that hei" husband had supplied her with the funds to
make the purchase). But if the vendee knew that the wife was acting as agent
for the husband, there would not be an undisclosed agency, but a disclosed one,
and, in such a case, only the principal (the husband) could maintain action.
See Jones v. Gould, 200 N. Y. 18, 92 N. E. 1071 (1910). If the wife purchases
the food in her own right, i.e., with her own funds, there is no agency, and the
husband can maintain no action for breach of warranty. Giminez v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934). In this connection, it
will be presumed that the wife was purchasing in her own right, in the absence
of affirmative evidence to the contrary. Giminez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
su~pra. But since there is ordinarily no agency between parent and child, where
the parent makes the purchase and the child is injured by eating the unwholesome food, the child cannot bring action against the vendee on the theory of
breach of warranty. Redmond v. Borden Farm Products Co., 245 N. Y. 512,
157 N. E. 838 (1927). Similarly, a husband cannot recover for injuries to his
wife where the wife made the purchase in her own right, Giminez v. A. & P.
Tea Co., supra, though if the husband made the purchase, he may recover, as
an incident to his damages, doctors' bills and other damages sustained by him by
reason of the injury to his wife. McAllister v. Stevens & Sanford, 147 Misc.
317, 265 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1933).
26 See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932),
discussed in (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 161; Handler, False and Misleading
Advertising (1929) 29 YALE L. J.22, 26; Notes (1932) 7 WAsH. L. Rxv. 351;
(1938) 13 IND. L. J.508.
In the usual case, however, plaintiff fails to show that the particular defect
in the food was within the terms of the express warranty. See Davis v. Van
Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) (no express warranty
that canned fruit was wholesome was created by statement on the label that
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such a case, privity of contract would exist between the manufacturer
and the buyer, for the advertisement or label may be considered as a
general offer which is accepted directly by the ultimate consumer
when he purchases the article. 27 But in New York it is probably
the law that no recovery can be had even on the theory of express
warranty, for although privity of contract may be present, there is
no privity of sale.2 8 This is another element required by the New
York courts in order that an action on a warranty be sustainable,
namely, that not only must there be privity of contract between the
defendant and plaintiff, but there must have also been a sale between
them.29
II.

On Theory of Negligence.

In New York, and in most jurisdictions, lack of privity will not
prevent a manufacturer of food products from being liable to a consumer because of negligence.30 Even this, however, is based upon an
exception to the general rule that a manufacturer of chattels is not
liable for negligence in their preparation to third parties with whom
he is not in privity of contract.8 ' This exception was first recognized
federal inspection was maintained at the place where food was manufactured,
and that the contents of the can were ready for use) ; Newhall v. Ward Baking
Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922) (false representation on the wrapper
of bread to the effect that the bread was 100% pure did not include the accidental presence of a nail therein); Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164,
138 N. E. 553 (1923) (holding that newspaper advertisements by manufacturer
that bread was made under ideal and clean conditions, that the materials used
were of the best, did not amount to an express warranty that no foreign substance could by accident find its way into the loaf, so as to render the manufacturer liable to an ultimate consumer injured by the presence of tin in the bread).
27 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 491.
In this connection, it is to be remembered that knowledge of an offer is
necessary for an acceptance, Fitch & Jones v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248 (1868),
so that the consumer must have read the advertisement or label prior to or
simultaneous with his purchase.
28 See Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N: Y. 73, 161 N. E. 423
(1928) (the court, by way of dictum, states that where the goods are sold with
a continuing written warranty for the benefit of the ultimate consumer, the
latter's recovery is limited to an action in deceit). See also Nelson v. Armour
Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W. 288 (1903); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me.
269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925), holding that labels and advertisements do not constitute warranties.
It has been suggested that the purchaser should be permitted to maintain,
without proof of negligence, a civil action for injury caused by the advertiser's
violation of the Printers' Ink Model Statute, which is § 421 of N. Y. PENAL
LAw, a penal statute enacted to protect a class of which the purchaser is a
member, on the same theory that civil actions are allowed under pure food
statutes. Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rav. 805, 812.
29 See note 17, supra.
30 See ME cK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 271, n.9 and cases cited.
3
1 Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N. E. 454
(1921); Cohen v. Brockaway, 240 App. Div. 182, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302 (3d
Dept. 1934) ; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
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in the case of articles inherently dangerous to human life,3 2 but was
later extended to include articles which, though not inherently dangerous, become so if negligently prepared, 33 unwholesome food being
considered in the latter category. 34
But in order for a consumer to avail himself of this remedy, he
must establish, by direct or circumstantial evidence, actual negligence
upon the part of the manufacturer,3 5 that the negligence of the dealer
was not a contributing factor,3 6 and lack of contributory negligence
on his part.3 7 It has been held that mere proof that the plaintiff has
eaten the food and consequent sickness, is not sufficient to make out
a prima facie case, nor does it shift the duty of coming forward with
evidence to establish due care on the manufacturer.3 8 Obviously,
32

33
MENT,

Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) ;
TORTS (1934) § 395.

RESTATE-

34 See note 30, supra.

3 Shepard v. Beck Bros., Inc., 131 Misc. 164, 225 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1927);

MuLIcK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 275, n.16 and cases cited.
36

Steinberg v. Bloom, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 774 (1938) ; Bourcheix v. Willow

Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N. Y. 1, 196 N. E. 617 (1935).

37 In determining contributory negligence, whether an ordinarily prudent
person must examine a piece of bread to discover possible presence of foreign or
deleterious substances, before eating it, is a question for the jury. Ternay v.

Ward Baking Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1917).
38 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253 (1896); Bigelow v.
Maine C. R. R., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912) ; Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy
Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N. E. 1078 (1913); Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166
N. Y. Supp. 798 (1916) ; Shepard v. Beck Bros., Inc., 151 Misc. 164, 225 N. Y.
Supp. 438 (1927) ; Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. W. 464 (1926) ; 11
R. C. L. 1121; cf. McPherson v. Capuano, 31 Ga. App. 82, 121 S. E. 580
(1924). Contra: Steel-Smith Dry Goods Co. v. Blythe, 208 Ala. 288, 94 So.
281 (1922); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382
(1920) (pr'oof of eating unwholesome pork and beans prepared by defendant,
and consequent injury constituted prima facie case) ; Doyle v. Fuerst &
Kraemer, 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911) (proof of eating cake and chocolate
with whipped cream in a confectionery store and consequent illness made out
prima fatie case).

In Rosensbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 181 App. Div. 97, 168 N. Y.

Supp. 505 (1st Dept. 1917), the court, holding that defendant was negligent as
a matter of law for failure to indicate on the labels of its product that the

contents were subject to deterioration, said: "It has been held that where one is
poisoned or injured by food purchased at a restaurant, or by bread or by milk,

proof of thai fact alone is sufficient to place the burden upon the proprietor of
the restaurant, the manufacturer of the bread, or the vendor of the milk, to
show the exercise of all due care on his part." The court cites New York

cases in support of its contention, but all, except Cook v. People's Milk Co., 90
Misc. 34, 152 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1915) (holding that mere proof of the drinking
of poisonous milk, plus resfilting injuries, entitled plaintiff to recover on the
theory of negligence against defendant), were not negligence cases, but were
decided on the theory of breach of implied warranty, where, of course, negligence need not be shown. But in Cohen v. Dugan Bros., 132 Misc. 896, 230
N. Y. Supp. 743 (1928), rev'd n other grounds, 227 App. Div. 714, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 769 (1st Dept. 1929), the court held, contra to the weight of authority,
that "the plaintiff, by showing the purchase of the defendant's bread and the
presence of the nail therein, and the resulting injury, has made out a prima facie
cause of action in negligence:"
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therefore, it is often very difficult for a consumer, who in most instances has no means of obtaining proof of the manufacturer's negligence, such facts being within the peculiar knowledge of the manufacturer or his servants, to sustain this burden.3 9 In some cases,
however, the consumer may avail himself of certain rules of law which
may facilitate the establishment of his prima facie case, namely, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the rule that violation of a pure
food statute is negligence per se.
a. Res Ipsa Loquitur.
The authorities are in accord as to the requirements for the application of the doctrine, viz.: (1) that the instrumentality causing
the injury must have been under the exclusive control of the defendant or his agents; (2) that the injury must be such as ordinarily
would not have occurred had not the defendant been negligent; and
(3) that the plaintiff must not have contributed in any voluntary way
to his injury. 40 Where all the essential requirements are present, the
plaintiff has a presumption of negligence in his favor, so that if the
defendant offers no evidence in rebuttal, the plaintiff will be entitled
to a directed verdict, providing his evidence is credible and unsuspicious. 41 Thus, the advantages to a plaintiff of having a res ipsa
presumption in his favor, is obvious.
In the usual food case, however, although the accident may be
such as would not have happened had those in control used proper
care, yet the essential requirement that the thing causing the injury
be under the exclusive management and control of the defendant is
lacking. 42 After the food product leaves the manufacturer's possession, it is often handled by a jobber, a retailer, and then the ultimate
consumer. Who is to say whether the unwholesome condition of the
food was caused by the manufacturer, and not by the improper handling or storage of those who later handle it? 43

It is because of

39 See Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F. (2d) 864 (App. D. C. 1936), wherein the
court said: "Restricting recovery by the injured member of the public to cases
predicated upon negligence is a seriously inadequate means of securing the
social interest in the individual safety, because of the great difficulty of proof for
the plaintiff. * * * He can hardly expect wholly unprejudiced testimony from
the defendant and his servants if they are called as witnesses. Cases will fail
for lack of the plaintiff's proof where there was no lack of the defendant's
fault, with the result that the individual injured will be unjustly burdened with
illness and expense."
40 See Note (1937) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280.
41 Hogan v. Manhattan Ry., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896); see 1
JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) § 104a; Note (1937) 11 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
280, 285.
But if the defendant offers satisfactory evidence in rebuttal, the plaintiff
must sustain his contention by a fair preponderance of evidence on the whole
case. Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922).
42 Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1916) ; Bourcheix v. Willow
Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N. Y. 1, 196 N. E. 617 (1935).
43 MELICK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 279 et seq.
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this fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has had, and should
44
have, a limited application in cases involving unwholesome food.
However, if the plaintiff can establish that at the time the unwholesome condition of the food came into existence it was in the exclusive control of the manufacturer, there would
seem to be no reason
45
why the doctrine should not be applicable.
In many instances, although there is no direct evidence of the
manufacturer's negligence, yet if the foreign substance is so embedded
in the food that it may be inferred that it entered the article at the
time of its preparation, the case will be permitted to go to the jury
who may infer negligence on the part of the manufacturer. 40
But
this is not to be confused with the doctrine of res ipsa, for it is only
the application of a well recognized rule of evidence that circumstantial evidence may 47
operate so forcefully as to make out a prima,facie
case of negligence.

b. Pure Food Statutes.
Statutes which control and regulate the preparation and sale of
food, have been construed in many jurisdictions as coming "within
44 Ibid.
45 In such case the requirement as expressed in Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166
N. Y. Supp. 798 (1916) and Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268
N. Y. 1, 196 N. E. 617 (1935), that plaintiff must show that no other cause
than defendant's negligence could have produced the injury would seem to be
satisfied, so that the doctrine should be applicable. See Note (1937) 14 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REV. 519, 525. For cases applying the doctrine, see Notes (1919) 4
A. L. R. 1559; (1927) 47 A. L. R. 148.
46 Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co., 100 Misc. 538, 163 N. Y. Supp. 396
(1916) (nail embedded in bread); Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., 167 N. Y.
Supp. 562 (1917) (particles of glass embedded in bread) ; Weiner v. Mager &
Thorne, 167 Misc. 338, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1938) (dead worms embedded in
bread); Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y.
Supp. 553 (2d Dept. 1926) (cockroaches embedded in crust of pie) ; Miller v.
National Bread Co., 247 App. Div. 88, 286 N. Y. Supp. 908 (4th Dept. 1936)
(lump of mineral wool and iron strands which ran through bread). See Notes
(1919) 4 A. L. R. 1559; (1927) 47 A. L. R. 148.
47 See Ristau v. E. Frank, Coe Co., 120 App. Div. 478, 479, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 1059 (2d Dept. 1907), aff'd without opinion, 193 N. Y. 630, 86 N. E. 1132
(1908) (" * * * if there were other facts showing negligence the maxim [res
ipsa loquitur] would not be needed as evidence to carry the case to the jury at
all, it is only where there is nothing but the bare happening of the accident, that
the plaintiff needs and the law gives him the help of the maxim to escape nonsuit") ; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 144 At. 884, 887 (R. I. 1929)
("Here the finding of the glass in the middle of the cream [the glass was
embedded in 'the frozen cream], and the tracing of the wrapped-up parcel
uninterfered with until served to plaintiff from the container provided by defendant and unwrapped by plaintiff would justify a reasonable human being in
drawing the logical inference that the glass got into the cream as a result of
the maker's carelessness in mixing. * * * This inference was more than a presumption or a substitute for evidence as a matter of procedure. It was a logical
deduction from the circumstances shown to exist between the making of the
cream and the finding of the glass."). See also Chevey Chase Dairy Co. v.
Mullineaux, 71 F. (2d) 982 (App. D. C. 1934); Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 469.
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the rule that where a statute for the protection or benefit of individuals
prohibits a person from doing an act, or .imposes a duty upon him
if he disobeys the prohibition or neglects to perform the duty, he is
liable to those for whose protection the statute was enacted for damages resulting proximately from such disobedience or neglect." 48.
Since these statutes were obviously intended to protect the health of
the public, anyone injured as a result of their violation may bring a
civil action against the violator, and this notwithstanding that privity
of contract does not exist between them. 49

As was said in Aboun-

dader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co.: 50 "We ought not to assume that
the Legislature intended to limit the duties of those violating such
provisions as these by any technical rules of contractual privity, but
that it was intended to impose a broad and far-reaching duty which
would be for the benefit of those general consumers who would be
the real sufferers in health or pocket if the statute was violated."
Nor need the plaintiff, in such an action, establish any intent or negligence on the defendant's part, for "violation of a statute designed
for the protection of others is, in itself, negligence." 51 Furthermore,
since the court will take judicial notice of a public statute, it is not
necessary in an action of this sort to plead a violation of the statute,
nor is it necessary to bring it to the attention of the court or counsel
during the trial. 2
In New York, the pure food statute is embodied in the Agricultural and Markets Law. Under the Act, "adulteration" is generally defined as any food which "bears or contains any poisonous
or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health." "
48 Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 106, 119
N. W. 428, 429 (1909). Accord: Kelley v. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac.
326 (1919); Aboundader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 154 N. E.

309 (1926).

49 Ibid.
50 243 N. Y. 458, 465, 154 N. E. 309, 311 (1926).
51
Armour v. Wanamaker, 202 Fed. 243 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913) ; Meshbesher
v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428 (1909); Kelly v.
John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919); Aboundader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 154 N. E. 309 (1926); Portgage Markets
Co. v. George, 117 Ohio St. 774, 146 N. E. 283 (1924); Culbertson v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930). 6 ontra: Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267
Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 177 Atl. 656
(N. H. 1935).
Contributory negligence, however, may defeat recovery even under the
statute. Friedman v. Beck, 250 App. Div. 87, 293 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dept.
1937), discussed in (1937) 50 HARv. L. IEv. 1316.
52 Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W.
428 (1909); Aboundader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 154 N. E.
309 (1926); Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Mfg.
Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928) ; cf. Giminez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934).
53 N. Y. AGRICULTURAL AND MARKETS LAW § 200(1), amended N. Y. Laws
1939, c. 797.
This section also gives specific instances in which food shall be deemed
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Previous to 1939 (at which date the Act was amended), the word
"ingredient" was used in place of the word "substance".5 4 Under
the Act as it then read, the case of Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy,
Inc.r' was decided. In that case, plaintiff, a chauffeur, was injured
when he swallowed several pieces of glass contained in a bottle of
cream given to him by his employer. The pieces of glass were about
the size of a bean. In an action against defendant, who had delivered
the cream to the employer, plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent as a matter of law on the theory that the sale of cream which
contained pieces of. glass violated Section 50 of the Agriculture and
Markets Law. In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals
said: "Section 50 provides: 'No person shall sell or exchange or
offer or expose for sale or exchange, any unclean, impure, unhealthy,
adulterated or unwholesome milk or any cream from the same, or
any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated, colored, or unwholesome
cream, or sell or exchange, or offer or expose for sale or exchange,
any substance in imitation or semblance of cream, which is not cream,
nor shall he sell or exchange, or offer or expose for sale or exchange
any such substance as and for cream * * *.'

Section 199 of the same

statute defines adulteration: 'Food shall be deemed adulterated * * *
5. If it contains any added poisonous or other added deleterious
ingredient which may render such article injurious to health * * *'
Section 46 defines cream as a certain portion of described milk 'to
which no substance whatsoever has been added' except milk as limited by this section. These provisions when read together indicate
that the legislative purpose was to prevent the sale of milk and cream
which have been subjected to some process by which their texture
had been or might be rendered spurious. Water would decrease its
strength, dirt of any kind its purity and other ingredients which had
mixed with and become a part of it would impair its natural quality.
These provisions do not appear to be aimed at foreign substances
such as stones or tacks or broken glass which do not become part
of the substance which 'masquerades as cream' but were intended to
preserve the quality of the liquid and to establish its standard. It
was not the cream which injuriously affected plaintiff, but it was the
glass which constituted no ingredient or part of the cream." The
adulterated, such as: "3. If it consists in whole or in part of a diseased, contaminated, filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for

food. 4. If it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under unsanitary

conditions, whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it

may have been rendered diseased, unwholesome or injurious to health."

There are also various sections in the Agricultural and Markets Law concerning the adulteration of specific foods, as for example, dairy products, N. Y.
AGRICULTURAL AND MARKETS LAW § 46, vinegar, N. Y. AGRICULTURAL AND
MARKETS LAW § 207.
54 This was contained in N. Y. AGRICULTURAL AND MARKETS LAW § 199,

and was as follows: "Food shall be deepied adulterated * * * 5. If it contains
oi other "deleterious ingredient which may render such
any added poisonoushealth."
article injurious to
55268 N. Y. 1, 5, 196 N. E. 617, 618 (1935).
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court distinguished Pine Grove Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Newtown
By-Products Mfg. Co.56 on the ground that "there, particles of steel
wire had been ground so fine as to enter into and become a component of the food. Here, the pieces of glass were no element in the
composition of the cream." The court, by emphasizing the word
"ingredient" as used in the statute, and by distinguishing the Pine
Grove case because there the wire was ground into the feed, limited
the availability of the Act to cases where the foreign substance is so
permeated with the food as to constitute a part or ingredient thereof.
But today, in view of the recent amendment to the Act insofar
as the definition of adulteration is concerned, which obviously discloses the legislative intent to broaden the scope of a manufacturers'
liability thereunder, and in view of the fact that the word "substance"
has been substituted for the word "ingredient", 57 it would appear
that the Bourcheix case is no longer authority on this point. Certainly, one would not be arbitrary and unreasonable in considering
glass in cream as a "deleterious substance" rendering the cream "injurious to health", and thus within the exact words of the Act as
amended.
III. Conclusions.
Outside of the question of privity of contract, it is obvious that
a more liberal view of the whole matter is required from the standpoint of the safeguardment of the public health. It is a question, not
with whom plaintiff's contract was made, but rather, who, as a matter of social justice, should bear the risk involved. There is no his56248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928). In that case, plaintiff purchased
some poultry feed from a dealer. The feed, containing ground wire, caused
the death of several thousand ducks to which it was fed. Plaintiff's action,
brought against the manufacturer to recover the losses suffered, was sustained.
The court held that the sale of the food was a violation of §§ 128, 130 of the
AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAw, which prohibits the sale of feeding stuffs
containing any substanqe injurious to the health of animals.
5 See note 54, supra. Consider AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW § 200(3),
which provides that food shall be deemed adulterated "if it consists in whole or
in part of a diseased, contaminated, filthy, putrid or decomposed substance, or
if it is otherwise unfit for food." (Italics ours.) The scope of the section
italicized would seem to be limitless insofar as unwholesome food is concerned.
As yet there have been no cases construing § 200. However, cases where parts
of animals or insects are found in food products should clearly come within the
Act. See Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S. C. 392, 154 S. E. 431 (1930) (where drink
containing parts of a decomposed rat was held violative of the South Carolina
pure food statute which provided that food is adulterated which "consists in
whole or in part of a filthy, decomposed, or putrid animal or vegetable substance,
or any portion of an animal unfit for food, whether manufactured or not");
Culbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930)
(holding on the authority of Tate v. Mauldin, su~pra, that beverage containing
yellowjacket, a poisonous insect, violated the statute, and constituted negligence
per se).

19391]

NOTES AND COMMENT

torical basis for the privity rule. 58 The manufacturer, by virtue of
impleader, will eventually be held liable. 9 In fact, as a matter of
business practice, the manufacturers consider themselves as solely
liable. 0 Limiting the consumer's remedy to an action in negligence,
is not always just. Negligence, though it exists, cannot always be
proven. 61 The inability of consumers to detect deleterious substances
in food, which necessarily results in their relying on the manufacturer's care, coupled with the complexities of our modem marketing
system, should result in holding the manufacturer, who prepares foodstuffs knowing that they will be sold to members of the public, liable
to the consumer without the necessity of proving negligence. 62 Aboli58 See note 18, supra; VOLD, op. cit. sUapra note 8, at 476 ("When it is realized that a warranty obligation is not necessarily promissory but may often be
independently imposed by law where found socially advantageous, it is clear
that arguments against the expansion based merely on the absence of contractual relations are far from convincing that the expansion is wrong. Where
applied, this expansion of the law of warranty throws the risk of injury from
defective goods directly upon the party best able to avoid it, the producer whose
conduct brought about the defect, instead of leaving the risk to rest on the
ultimate user, who with regard to defects in goods necessarily used is, under
present-day conditions, completely dependent on remote producers. It may,
therefore, have a strong tendency to improve market conditions by eliminating
such defects").
59 See note 21, supra; N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 193(2) ; PASHKER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORX PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1937) 481.
60 Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods (1930)

25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 417 (" * * * the practice among manufac-

turers and dealers with regard to the operation of the manufacturer's warranty
against defects in material and workmanship is that the complaints are satisfied
either by the manufacturer directly or through the agency of the dealer. The
manufacturer assumes that he is directly liable to the user. If the complaint
goes through the dealer, it is for convenience's sake. The dealer does not regard
himself as having any personal responsibility. All parties regard him as a
conduit or intermediary for adjustment purposes, even though he has himself
warranted the goods and sold them as his own. The facts manifest a practical
repudiation by the manufacturers and dealers of the legalistic notion that warranties of personal property should be effective only between parties in privity
of contract. Business practice in this regard is in accord with the minority of
the American courts, and may, if supported by other commercial usage, justify
an overthrow of the majority privity of contract theory. Such a result would
be another praiseworthy assimilation of the law of real and personal property").
61 See note 39, supra.
62 Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (D. C. N. Y. 1912) ("The
remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sale. The obligation of the manufacturer should not be
based alone upon privity of contract. It should rest, as was once said, upon
'the. demands of social justice'") ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456,
12 P. (2d) 409, 412 (1932) ("Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated vast changes have taken place in the economic structure of the Englishspeaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great transition.
Radio, billboards and the products of the printing press have become the means
of creating a large part of the demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that
would permit manufacturers to create a demand for their products by representation that they possess qualities which they in fact do not possess, and then,
because there is no privity of contract existing between the consumer and
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tion of the privity rule is not the only solution, for a more liberal
interpretation of pure food statutes so as to include foods with foreign deleterious substances within the meaning of adulteration would
have the same effect. True, the manufacturer would virtually be an
insurer of the wholesomeness of the food. But if this is the way a
manufacturer's vigilance can be stimulated, then the safeguarding of
the public health requires it.
Louis J.

GUSMANO.

AWARD OF DAMAGES IN ADDITION TO RESCISSION IN SALE OF
GOODS.

I.
The vendee's right to rescind for breach of warranty is governed in New York by Section 150, subdivision I(d), of the Personal Property Law 1 which reads:
"

* * * Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller,

the buyer may at his election, * * * (rescind) the contract or
the sale and refuse to receive the goods, or if the goods have
already been received, return them to the seller and recover
the price or any part thereof which has been paid."
This section codified the New York common law rule which limited2
the rescinding vendee's recovery to the return of the purchase price.
manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if damage results from
the absence of those qualities when such absence is not readily noticeable") ; see
dissenting opinion of Clarkson, J., in Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard, 208
N. C. 1, 179 S. E .30 (1935) ("It is of the greatest importance to the health of
the general public that, when they purchase food or drink, it should be pure,
wholesome and fit for use. It is a hard measure and almost impossible to prove
negligence, and by the weight of authorities this rule under modern conditions is
fast growing obsolete. The true rule, in more recent decisions, is that there is
an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the consumer, the general public,
where there is no opportunity to inspect, that the food or drink is pure, wholesome, and fit for consumption") ; Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. 931
(1915); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924).
1 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 150, subd. 1 (d) ; note 11, infra.
2
Apex Chemical Co. v. Compson, 171 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1918) ; Oetien v.
Whitehead Metal Co., 126 Misc. 369, 213 N. Y. Supp. 600 (1926) ; Bennett v.
Piscitello, 170 Misc. 177, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 69 (1938); Loader v. Brooklyn
Chair Co., 64 App. Div. 615, 72 N. Y. Supp. 297 (2d Dept. 1901); Joannes
Bros. Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 121 Misc. 474, 201 N. Y. Supp. 409
(1923), aff'd, 209 App. Div. 868, 205 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st Dept. 1924) ; Weigel
v. Cook, 237 N. Y. 136, 142, 142 N. E. 444, 446 (1923) (the court modified
judgment of the lower court by deducting damages, including general expenses

